



EQUITY SCHEMES IN SOUTH AFRICA: BENEFITS DELIVERED TO FARM 




























Michigan State University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
 
 




2003   ii 
 ABSTRACT   
 
With the end of Apartheid, the South African Government created and corrected 
agricultural factor and product market failures in its attempt to improve the distribution of 
wealth and incorporate previously disadvantaged farmers into the mainstream of 
agricultural activities. Some commercial farmers responded strategically to the new 
equity-based policies on factor and product markets by initiating equity-schemes with 
farm workers in order to maintain/increase their profits given the new local economic and 
political environment and global competition. Hence, most equity-schemes are organized 
according to the commercial farmers’ capacities. The purpose of this paper is to analyze 
the organizational structure of the equity-schemes as a function of the commercial 
farmers strategy (production vs. marketing).  
This study is based on interviews of emerging farmers, former and present farm 
workers, commercial farmers, non-Governmental Organizations and Governmental 
agencies. The results show that equity-schemes tend to benefit commercial farmers but 
the degree to which farm workers’ gain access to factor and product markets depends on 
commercial farmers’ strategy. Then, the paper assesses alternative organizational 
structures of equity-schemes to maximize the benefits delivered to farm workers. Finally, 
utilizing the Peterson-Wysocki-Harsh Model, the issues of why the Government policies 
have not accomplished its objectives are discussed and recommendations to broaden the 
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1. Introduction 
 
The end of Apartheid, dramatically, changed the socio-economic environment in 
South Africa, including the Agrifood sector. First, the new Government has created and is 
creating policies that pursue economic equality and economic growth; in the agriculture 
sector this translates into an attempt to eliminate farm workers’ barriers to entry to factor 
markets so that they can become competitive producers, not just remain unskilled 
laborers. However, several of these new policies have had negative impacts on 
commercial farmers and the extent to their positive impact on farm workers is not clear. 
Secondly, the end of Apartheid meant the elimination of restrictive marketing policies for 
agribusinesses and the lifting of sanctions against South Africa; hence, South African 
agribusinesses are now competing globally.  
The two groups in the agricultural sector most impacted by these dramatic 
changes are the commercial farmers and farm workers. Commercial farmers own most of 
the economic resources (land, capital, knowledge and marketing skills) that, historically, 
allowed them to participate in the most profitable sector of the South African agrifood 
supply chains. On the other hand, farm workers inherited no resources (land, capital, 
knowledge and marketing skills) from the previous regime; thus, restricting their 
participation in the same supply chains. Some commercial farmers’ strategic response to 
the new Government policies and economic environment is to create equity-schemes with 
their farm workers. An equity-scheme is a new business institution formed by the equity 
commitment of the partners who maintain their separate identity and therefore can exit 
the scheme at any time. The objective for the commercial farmers in participating in these 
equity-schemes is to retain and/or increase their competitiveness and profitability. The   2
Government perceives this approach as a way to increase the income of farm workers and 
encourage them to actively participate in the most profitable part of the agricultural 
supply chains.  
This new business approach has not been widely adopted by the commercial 
farmers, only 61 equity-schemes have been started during the 1995 to 2001 period 
(Knight and Lyne, 2001). During that same time there were between 40,000-60,000 
commercial farmers (Stuijt, 2001). This small percentage may indicate that the new 
policies (land redistribution, water licenses, and cheaper capital) are not feasible and/or 
beneficial to the majority of commercial farmers to enter into partnerships with their 
former workers.   
This paper explores a unique issue in the agribusiness literature. In general, the 
agribusiness literature focuses on equity schemes as a strategic decision to break barriers 
to entry into specific markets (Adams et al, 1999; Bouton, Glen et al, 1996; Gow et al, 
2002; Rauch, 2001; Jaffee et al, 1995; and Neven et al, 2002). In the case of South 
Africa, the literature has focused on equity-schemes as a response of commercial farmers 
to land redistribution and previously disadvantaged farmers empowerment policies 
(Bashoff, 2000; Eckert et al, 1996; Ewert, 1998; Hamman, 2001; Hamman et al, 1998; 
Karaan et al, 2000; Kirsten et al, 1998; Knight et al, 2001; Knight et al, 2002; McKenzie, 
1996; Ngqangweni, 1996; Surplus People Project, 1999; and Tilley, 2002). This paper 
extends the literature by addressing the equity-schemes’ organizational structure as a 
function of the commercial farmers’ strategy to maintain and/or increase their 
profitability given the changes in the factor and product markets.   3
In the next section, the Government policies that have introduced factor and 
product market failures are reviewed. Section three analyzes commercial farmers’ 
strategic organizational structure response to the policy and economic changes with 
respect to equity-schemes. The analysis is based on four equity-schemes from the 
Western Cape of South Africa: Lutouw (wine grapes and cash crops), Thandi (wine and 
deciduous fruit), Thembani (citrus), and Goedehoop (citrus and deciduous fruit). The data 
was collected by using semi-structured interviews with commercial farmers, farm 
workers and other partners involved in the cases. Section four studies how the equity-
schemes help farm workers address their constraints. Section five suggests organizational 
changes to improve equity-schemes in order to increase farm workers’ access to factor 
and product markets. Section six offers recommendations to policy makers to improve 
factor transfer through equity-schemes. 
 
2. Old and New Market Failures 
The end of Apartheid in South Africa brought new Government policies and new 
market conditions that affected factor and product markets in the agribusiness sector. 
Many farm workers were expecting to become small farmers with the end of Apartheid. 
However, farm workers still face barriers to entry to factor and product markets such as: 
(1) farm workers do not have access to land; although the majority of South African 
population is black (80%), white farmers own 86% of the potential arable land with an 
average farm size of 1,300 ha per farmer. In contrast, 50% of black farmers have less 
than 1 ha., 22% have 1-2 ha., and 1% more than 10 ha. (www.gov.za, 2003); (2) black 
farmers do not have access to credit; only 5% of all Land Bank loans were accredited to   4
high-risk customers (black farmers); (3) farm workers have low levels of education; 77% 
of the white farmers have completed high-school while 1% of black farmers have 
completed high school (www.gov.za, 2003); and (4) black farmers do not have the 
knowledge and the networks to grow and market high-valuable crops, white farmers 
know the characteristics that a high-value crop should be produced under in order to be 
sold because of their many years experience of selling to these markets. (5) The sum of 
these barriers to entry in the factor markets enforced the barriers to entry in the produce 
markets. Currently, black farmers sell principally to rural and informal markets while 
white farmers sell to urban wholesalers and retailers, and export markets (Weatherspoon 
et al, 2003). This is a major concern given that supermarkets sell 50-60% share of all 
food sold in South Africa (Weatherspoon et al, 2003).  
The new Government policies were designed to promote wealth redistribution. 
Their primary focus was to increase the participation of black farmers/farm workers in 
the more profitable activities of the agricultural sector (i.e. highly-profitable supply 
chains). These policies created failures and simultaneously eliminated failures in the 
factor and product markets in order to benefit farm workers; hence, creating factor and 
product markets barriers to entry for commercial farmers. Examples of these factor (land, 
water, labor and credit) and product markets failures follow.  
Land market failure. Land grants are given to farm workers to buy land. Through 
the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) policy, black citizens of 
South Africa over 18 years old can receive from R 20,000 (US$ 2,500
1) to R 100,000 
(US$ 12,600) (they must contribute a minimum of R 5,000 (US$ 630) that can be in kind, 
labor and/or cash) for land acquisition, land improvement, infrastructure investment, 
                                                 
1 The exchange rate is R 7.92 per dollar at April 2003. South African Reserve Bank, 2003.   5
capital assets and short-term agricultural inputs (Ministry of Agriculture and Land 
Affairs, 2002). This policy reduces the barrier to entry for the land market for farm 
workers. However, this policy creates a market failure by making land cheaper for farm 
workers than for commercial farmers.  
Water market failure. The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) 
gives licenses to storage water only to projects that involve black people. In this case, the 
Government’s policy creates a barrier to entry to the water market for white commercial 
farmers.  
Labor Market failure. With the end of Apartheid, farm workers are free to choose 
where to work. Therefore, this policy eliminated a labor market failure; labor is no longer 
captive. Commercial farmers need to compete with other farmers and with other rural and 
urban non-farm activities to attract labor. The new policy increases the cost of labor for 
commercial farmers. The new Government also established a minimum wage for farm 
workers. This creates a failure in the labor market because the interaction of supply and 
demand does not set the price for labor. In South Africa (given the high unemployment 
rate of 37%) the minimum wage may be too high relative to the equilibrium wage. Thus, 
the price of labor that commercial farmers must pay has artificially increased.  
Credit market failure. Cheap credit (4-5% below commercial loan rates) is 
available to projects that involve previously disadvantaged people (black farm workers) 
as partners. The loans come from Khula (money from the European Union and the South 
African Government) and the Land Bank. This policy establishes a commercial farmers’ 
barrier to entry to cheaper capital markets. In addition, the new South African 
Government eliminated the previous subsidies that commercial farmers used to receive.   6
The policy eliminated a market failure (positive externalities received by commercial 
farmers) in land and capital markets which has effectively increased the cost of land and 
capital for commercial farmers.   
Product market failure. The Government deregulated the markets in 1994; the 
cooperatives that used to regulate price and monopolize the commercialization of 
agricultural products were privatized. Now, many local intermediaries have appeared in 
the supply chains increasing the transactions costs for commercial farmers. Lastly, the 
new Government stopped subsidizing commercial farmers’ products. The Government, 
removing a failure of the product market, no longer guarantees a price for products; thus, 
increasing the volatility of agricultural prices and the risk to commercial farmers. 
In addition to Government policies, the end of Apartheid opened the borders for 
trade and brought global competition changing the market’s structures and the supply 
chains. Commercial farmers are now exposed to international competition and global 
concentration of retailers (supermarkets). Local and foreign retailers are demanding 
higher grades and standards. To meet these requirements, commercial farmers need to 
make investments in technology and managerial capacities. Furthermore, agrifood 
markets are more consumer driven “requiring differentiated product, continuous process 
innovation, highly specialized product delivery, and customer support services” (Gow et 
al, 2002).  
Moreover, the end of Apartheid means that black people can make claims to the 
Government for their socio-economic needs. In South Africa there is implicit social 
pressure for wealth redistribution which is warranted given that South Africa has one of 
the worst Gini coefficients in the world: 59.3 (UNDP, 2002). This pressure along with the   7
recent backlash against commercial farmers in Zimbabwe increases the potential for 
instability in the farming operations. An instable social environment can increase the 
costs of production. It also creates uncertainty about the future of current operations.  
The redistribution policies established by the new Government affected the factor 
and product markets faced by farm workers and commercial farmers. The policies did not 
necessarily address all the constraints faced by farm workers (for example: access to 
education and lack of knowledge and networks to grow high-value crops). Moreover, in 
most of the cases the policies ended the benefits commercial farmers used to receive 
during the Apartheid. Consequently, some of the commercial farmers have responded to 
these changes in factor and product markets by initiating equity-schemes with their farm 
workers. The next section analyses the decision process of those commercial farmers who 
entered into the equity-schemes. 
 
3. Responses to New Barriers by Commercial Farmers 
The selection of the equity-scheme as the strategy to reduce or eliminate 
commercial farmers’ barriers to factor markets is studied using the Peterson Wysocki 
Harsh (PWH) model (Peterson et al, 2002).  
The Peterson Wysocki Harsh (PWH) Model (Peterson et al, 2002) states that 
when a firm makes a transaction
2 it considers the costs of coordination errors and the cost 
of the governance structure, and adjusts its vertical coordination strategy appropriately. 
According to PWH the choices for a vertical coordination strategy lie in a continuum 
determined by the level of intensity of coordination control. Spot markets have the lowest 
level of intensity of control while vertical integration has the highest. The transitional 
                                                 
2 Transaction is defined as a shift in a resource’s property rights (Staatz et al, 2002)   8
levels with increasing intensity of control are specification contracts, relation-based 
alliances and equity-based alliances. The cost of coordination error is a function of asset 
specificity (how well an asset can be used in other transactions or by other users without 
sacrificing the productivity of the asset or incurring costs of adapting the asset to the new 
transaction) and complementarity (that exists when individual activities across a 
transaction produce a higher output in combination than the sum of the outputs generated 
by the individual activities; in other words, the marginal product of each activity can not 
be measured). Higher asset specificity and higher complementarity increase the costliness 
of coordination errors; and hence, firms will choose strategies with higher intensity of 
control. On the other hand, firms also consider the cost of the governance structure (the 
cost of operating the strategy) that is higher in strategies with high intensity of control. 
PWH states that firms will move from its current strategy if it is too costly in terms of 
costliness of coordination errors or governance structure. A new strategy will be selected 
if it is less costly, feasible for the firm (capital availability, control competence, partners 
availability and institutional acceptability), and its returns (after considering costs and 
risks) are favorable for the firm relative to the current strategy (Peterson et al, 2002; and 
Mainville et al, 2003). 
By initiating equity-schemes with farm workers, commercial farmers intend to 
reduce or eliminate the new barriers to factor markets. Some commercial farmers wanted 
to expand their operations needing to acquire production factors (land, water, labor and 
credit). The first step in the PWH model is to consider the costliness of coordination 
errors of that strategy. For some commercial farmers it may be too costly (in terms of   9
coordination errors) to expand without making sure that they will have all the production 
factors given complementarities among land, water, labor and credit.  
The second step of the PWH model is to choose another strategy of coordination 
if it is less costly, feasible and profitable than the first option. For example: (1) relying on 
spot markets is not feasible because capital availability and institutional acceptability. It 
will be too costly for commercial farmers to buy additional land at market prices and 
socially unacceptable; (2) vertical integration is not possible because commercial farmers 
can not produce labor or water; (3) the problem with specification contracts is that there 
are few potential partners (partners availability) with knowledge and capital to produce 
the crops that commercial farmers need. If commercial farmers contract farm workers, 
commercial farmers should provide knowledge and capital; a very risky and costly 
strategy for commercial farmers; (4) a relation-based alliance does not guarantee that 
commercial farmers will assure all the production factors. The focus of control in a 
relation-based alliance is the relationship among partners. The distrust (influenced by the 
Apartheid system) between farm workers and commercial farmers makes the alliance 
highly unstable; (5) an equity-based alliance is less costly because it reduces the 
costliness of coordination errors making sure that complementarity among production 
factors exists.  
The third step in the PWH model is to analyze if the selected strategy is feasible. 
In this case, is an equity-based alliance feasible?  Equity-based alliances in South Africa 
have the following characteristics: there is capital availability (there is cheaper loans for 
empowerment projects), control competence (commercial farmers can manage/control 
effectively the alliance because they have the marketing and managerial skills),   10
availability of partners (there is a group of farm workers interested in forming the 
alliance) and institutional acceptability (it responds to social pressure for wealth 
redistribution).  
The final question in the PWH model is if the feasible strategy’s returns are 
expected to be favorable. Commercial farmers control the management of the equity-
schemes, reducing their risks. In addition, commercial farmers design the equity-
schemes’ to take advantage of their capacities. Equity-schemes also support commercial 
farmers’ strategy to grow horizontally reducing their costs and improving their response 
to consumers’ needs. Through equity-schemes commercial farmers achieve economies of 
scale
3 and scope
4 in marketing (as in the cases of Lutouw, Thandi, Thembani and 
Goedehoop). Commercial farmers use their same facilities (packing houses, trucks and 
contacts) to commercialize a higher volume of product. Furthermore, through equity-
schemes commercial farmers can offer more variety of produce or focus on niche 
markets; hence, increasing their competitiveness as suppliers. Moreover, commercial 
farmers are reducing their transaction costs
5 (as in the case of Lutouw, Thembani and 
Goedehoop). Higher volume and variety allows them not to use intermediaries that 
perform the gathering activity. Commercial farmers use the production of the equity-
scheme to complement their own supply contracts. Hence, commercial farmers expect 
that the equity-scheme will produce favorable returns, given its risk and costs. However, 
equity-schemes appear not to be beneficial enough for other commercial farmers (the 
                                                 
3 The average cost of a unit produced decreases as the quantity produced increases (Besanko et al, 2000). 
4 The cost of producing two or more varieties (different goods or services) by a single firm is lower than the 
cost of producing these varieties by two or more separate firms (Besanko et al, 2000). 
5 Transaction costs include the cost (time and expense) of gathering and processing information about a 
transaction; and negotiating, writing, monitoring and enforcing transactions (Staatz et al, 2002; and 
Besanko et al, 2000).   11
majority). The reasons why other commercial farmers do not establish equity-schemes 
are analyzed in section 6.  
An equity-scheme with farm workers is the commercial farmers’ strategy to 
eliminate barriers to entry to factor markets (water, land, labor and credit) and to keep 
profiting in the product markets delivering a higher volume or variety of produce with the 
required quality. Commercial farmers manage the equity-schemes because they have the 
financial, marketing, managerial and technical capacities. Hence, the equity-schemes are 
structured to take advantage of commercial farmers’ capacities (i.e. commercial farmers’ 
capacities determine the organizational structure of the equity-schemes). However, 
equity-schemes do not, necessarily, provide explicit mechanisms to guarantee farm 
workers active participation in the supply chains. Therefore, it is necessary to study the 
advantages/disadvantages that equity-schemes present to farm workers. 
 
4. Effect on Farm Workers (Outcome) 
The previous section showed that commercial farmers initiate equity-schemes to 
increase their own profitability. For farm workers the equity-schemes have the potential 
to eliminate barriers of entry to factor and product markets from the prior political 
regime. This section analyzes the effectiveness of the equity-schemes in terms of 
improving farm workers access to factors (land, credit, education and knowledge, 
described in section 2) and product markets (see Table 1 for summary). 
The mechanism that defines farm workers access to land lies in a continuum, 
according with farm workers rights to land (level of land tenure) in the equity-scheme. In 
the lowest level, the commercial farmers own the land and lease it to the equity-scheme,   12
hence the farm workers do not have access to land. In the middle level, the equity-scheme 
owns the land and not the farm workers. For example, farm workers own the land as long 
as they stay in the equity-scheme. If they exit the equity-scheme or if the project goes 
bankrupt, the farm workers lose the land, thus no land tenure. In the highest level, farm 
workers own the land and lease it to the equity-scheme. In this case, farm workers have 
land tenure because they will eventually own the land, independently, of the financial 
performance of the equity-scheme.  
The degree of farm workers land tenure is partially dependent on the strategy of 
the commercial farmers when they initiate the equity-scheme (focus on production versus 
focus on marketing). In Lutouw and Goedehoop the commercial farmers’ strategy is to 
expand their production and marketing outlets. Therefore, they need to assure that the 
extra produce (wine grapes, sweet melons, sweet potatoes, kabatchus, citrus and 
deciduous fruit) will meet the grades and standards of customers. Consequently, in these 
two cases, the commercial farmers invested in land to control the production and 
marketing operations. In Thandi, the commercial farmers’ strategy is to increase profits 
from their current operations and gain access to niche markets hence, they do not need to 
control the additional land. In fact just the opposite happened; commercial farmers gave 
part of their land (wine grapes) to the equity-scheme; so, the produce from the land 
contributed could be marketed in the “fair trade” niche. In Thembani, the commercial 
farmers’ strategy is to strengthen their position as marketers of citrus. They are interested 
in increasing their sources of qualified citrus. Thus, commercial farmers will exit the 
equity-scheme once it can produce the desired quality then, the farm workers will be the 
owners of the land.     13
Farm workers access to credit is characterized by different methods arranged in a 
continuum according to the level of use of developed capital markets (Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange, foreign investors, multilateral institutions, etc). In the lowest level (less 
use of developed capital markets), farm workers get land redistribution grants or 
Government subsidies that are non-repayable. In the next stage, farm workers get 
financing from NGOs or foundations in which only part of the money is repayable and 
the interest rates are lower than commercial loan rates. In the next level, farm workers get 
financing from multilateral institutions (African Development Bank, European Union, 
World Bank, etc). The total amount of the loan is repayable but at lower rates than 
commercial loans. In the final level, farm workers access loans from private financial 
institutions or investors. It is necessary to clarify that access to credit excludes other 
partners’ financial contribution because partners invest in exchange for rights to profits.  
The source of financing used by the equity-schemes depends on the strategy of 
commercial farmers including the size and/or crop of the project (in terms of factors 
needed: water, land, labor and capital). In Lutouw (300 ha.), the commercial farmers’ 
strategy is to expand their own short term (tomatoes, onions, kabatchus, sweet potatoes, 
sweet melons) and long term (wine production) production. Lutouw accessed all four 
types of financing: non-repayable capital (DWAF’ subsidy), partially-repayable capital at 
lower rates (SAWIT), totally-repayable capital at lower rates (Khula), and commercial 
loans (banks). Lutouw’s farm workers get DWAF and SAWIT money because of DWAF 
(license to access water) and SAWIT (financial investment in empowerment schemes) 
policy to make sure farm workers are partners in the equity-scheme. In addition, 
commercial farmers received a Khula loan and to fully fund the project they needed a   14
regular commercial loan. In Goedehoop, the commercial farmers’ strategy is to expand 
their own production (27 ha) by buying a farm where citrus and deciduous fruit are 
already in production. Goedehoop’s farm workers get non-repayable financing (land 
grant) and have access to financing that is totally-repayable at lower rates (Khula). In this 
case, the Khula loan is enough to finance the investment, given the smaller size of the 
project. In Thandi, commercial farmers’ strategy is to increase profits by accessing new 
markets with its current wine grapes production. Thus, they contributed 14 ha of wine 
grapes (already producing) to the equity-scheme. Thandi’s farm workers get non-
repayable financing (land grants). The commercial farmers of Thembani have the strategy 
to increase their sources of citrus by mentoring the establishment of farms. Besides 
Thembani, this group of commercial farmers financed other independent farm operations: 
Solly Skotic (40 ha) and Malusi (30 ha). Solly and Malusi were previous farm workers 
who are currently managing citrus farms owned by the Land Bank. Thembani will 
purchase 600 ha of land with an established citrus orchard. Thembani’s farm workers 
have access to non-repayable funds (land grants) and totally-repayable funds at lower 
interest rates (private investors). The size of this project forced the commercial farmers to 
search for cheap capital markets with the capacity to finance the project. Therefore, 
commercial farmers are contacting private investors in Germany and the Netherlands 
instead of local banks. In summary, the strategy of the commercial farmers and the size 
of the project define the sources of financing that farm workers access through the equity-
scheme. Only land grants and NGO’s funds are given directly to farm workers. Farm 
workers gain access to more sophisticated financing mechanisms because they are 
partners in equity-schemes managed by commercial farmers.    15
Farm workers access to education and knowledge lies in a continuum according 
with the strategic positions that farm workers would occupy in the equity-scheme and 
their existing education level. The majority of farm workers are illiterate, the lowest level 
in the continuum. These workers may receive basic education (literacy training) to 
improve the position they occupy in the equity-scheme. In the second level, farm workers 
are literate and may receive additional training so that they qualify for lower level 
management positions where reading and basic mathematical and accounting skills are 
required. In the highest level, with the least number of potential candidates, are those that 
qualify for university level training.  These farm workers will become the marketing and 
production managers for the organization.  
In the cases of Lutouw and Goedehoop, commercial farmers’ strategy is to 
increase their production to commercialize it through their own marketing channels. 
Therefore, commercial farmers will keep control over the marketing activities and train 
farm workers in production techniques (irrigation) to guarantee the quality of the 
produce. Moreover, farm workers receive literacy courses. Farm workers do not occupy 
strategic managerial or marketing positions. In Thandi, commercial farmers’ strategy is to 
increase their profits accessing niche markets. “Fair trade” label implies that farm 
workers are the ones in charge of production or transitioning to it. Consequently, some 
farm workers are receiving university training in production, management and wine 
making. However, no farm workers occupy strategic positions in the marketing area. In 
Thembani, farm workers will receive high-school and university training in production 
and management. Farm workers do not have access to marketing positions because 
commercial farmers will be in charge of the commercialization.    16
The level of training farm workers receive is directly tied to the commercial 
farmers’ strategy. In all the cases reviewed, commercial farmers keep control of the 
marketing activities; thus, effectively limiting farm workers access to strategic marketing 
knowledge (grades and standards, commercialization processes and contacts). 
The kind of markets that farm workers access is characterized by a continuum 
according with the levels of grades and standards required by the customers. The first and 
lowest level is the local open markets (where customers do not impose specific grades 
and standards), the second level is the wholesale market where some standards are 
imposed, third are the export intermediaries (that require specific standards), and the 
fourth level is the foreign/local retailers (that are highly strict about grades and standard 
requirements).  
Once again, the type of supply chain depends on the commercial farmers’ 
strategy, contacts, experience and risk aversion. In Lutouw and Goedehoop commercial 
farmers supplied export intermediaries prior to the equity-scheme and their current goal is 
to expand their operations. Therefore, farm workers now have access to customers that 
impose specific standards. In the case of Lutouw, the commercial farmers are also 
growing cash crops (tomatoes to a processor and onions to the local intermediary). These 
markets are not very strict with grades and standards. In Thandi, the strategy is to sell 
apples, pears and wine to “fair trade” markets and it is important to note that this market 
would not be open to either commercial farmers or farm workers if they do not work 
together. This export market is highly demanding in terms of grades and standards. In 
Thembani, commercial farmers need to strengthen their position as suppliers to foreign   17
retailers. Hence, the farm workers now have access to the UK citrus supply chain where 
the supermarkets are highly strict in grades and standards.  
In summary, commercial farmers shape the organizational structure of the equity-
scheme. Therefore, farm workers’ access to land, credit, education, knowledge and 
product markets depends on the commercial farmers’ objectives. Thus, the following step 
is to determine mechanisms to improve farm workers access to factor and product 
markets given that commercial farmers’ choose equity-schemes as part of their overall 
portfolio strategy. 
 
5. Improving Equity-schemes for Farm Workers 
As analyzed before, equity-schemes do not necessarily guarantee farm workers 
access to factor markets. The majority of farm workers do not have land tenure, access to 
financing other than Government programs, limited education level, and minimum 
business and strategic marketing experience and knowledge. This section makes 
recommendations to improve farm workers access to land, credit, education and 
knowledge through their participation in the equity-schemes with respect to commercial 
farmers’ strategy.  
If the objective of the new policy is to transform a group of farm workers into 
commercial farmers within a certain time period; then farm workers need to resolve their 
constraints to accessing both production factors and product markets. With the four case 
studies reviewed, the commercial farmers control the access to these markets. Therefore, 
the policy chosen should not impose high costs for commercial farmers; so, commercial 
farmers will still be interested in forming equity-schemes eliminating farm workers’   18
barriers to factor and product markets. Three policies are proposed: (1) outgrower-
schemes, (2) equity-schemes separating production and marketing operations, and (3) the 
intervention of a third party institution. Each one is studied according to the commercial 
farmers’ strategy, costs, and the degree to which it eliminates farm workers’ barriers.  
Policy (1) recommends the separation of the production and marketing activities; 
hence, the equity-scheme will operate as an outgrower-scheme. Commercial farmers who 
want to expand their marketing activities will source from farm workers. In order to get 
the quality desired, commercial farmers should provide capital, and production and 
managerial knowledge to farm workers. They are already providing these factors in the 
current equity-schemes (such as Thembani). The new policy increases the risks and costs 
for commercial farmers. To diminish commercial farmers’ risk, the Government should 
enforce the contracts signed between commercial farmers and farm workers. To diminish 
their costs and provide incentives to sign contracts with farm workers the Government 
could reduce tax rates for those commercial farmers who buy produce from previously 
disadvantaged people. Farm workers will acquire land applying to Government land 
grants. The disadvantage of this policy is that commercial farmers will retain the most 
profitable activities (marketing). Only a few farm workers (those who have more 
entrepreneurial capacities) have the skills to access the more lucrative local and foreign 
retailers in the near future. Policy (2) also proposes a separation of production and 
marketing activities when the commercial farmers’ strategy is to expand as producers and 
marketers. The difference is that there is a clear partnership between the commercial 
farmers and farm workers. Specifically, two equity-schemes are created; one that grows 
the crops and the farm workers have the majority ownership; and the other that   19
commercializes the produce and the commercial farmers have the majority ownership. In 
this case, commercial farmers will transfer production and management techniques to 
farm workers. Farm workers will have a higher opportunity to learn marketing skills. The 
problem with this strategy is that it increases commercial farmers’ costs (training). Thus, 
the Government should provide tax incentives to firms that have previously 
disadvantaged people in strategic managerial positions. This incentive should increase as 
the percentage of strategic positions occupied by farm workers increases.  
The third (3) policy suggests the involvement of a third party institution (private) 
that has market knowledge and financial capacity. This institution will finance farm 
workers participation and will transfer technical and market knowledge. Farm workers 
will apply to land grants to finance the land. In this case, why it is still necessary to have 
the involvement of a commercial farmer? Third party institutions may have market 
knowledge but not necessarily market contacts and experience operating in the respective 
supply chain. Thus, the third party institution will negotiate on behalf of farm workers. 
Because commercial farmers have marketing experience, they will manage the daily 
operations of the equity-scheme. The issue is that commercial farmers may decide to exit 
the equity-scheme at any time. In that case, it is necessary to promote the commitment of 
the commercial farmers with the success (profitability) of the equity-scheme. 
Commercial farmers should put their own assets as collateral for a commercial loan. 
Knight et al. (2002) recommend “temporary moratorium on the sale” of the commercial 
farmers’ shares. However, a temporary moratorium can discourage further investment by 
the commercial farmers. Putting their own capital at risk, commercial farmers will pursue 
profit generation. The disadvantage with this policy is that there are not many third party   20
institutions with both the business capacity and the financial budget to support farm 
workers participation into equity-schemes. 
Although an equity-scheme will not solve all the structural problems (some 
inherited from the prior regime and some inherent to the agricultural characteristics of 
small farmers) that constrain farm workers’ participation in high-value supply chains, the 
organizational structure of the equity-scheme can be adjusted to provide farm workers’ 
higher access to factor and product markets. Thus, the consecutive step is to suggest 
policies to increase the adoption of equity-schemes between commercial farmers and 
farm workers. 
 
6. Policy Recommendations (Why not other commercial farmers?) 
It has been shown that the driving force behind the creation of equity-schemes is 
commercial farmers. Even though equity-schemes can improve commercial farmers’ 
profitability, the majority of commercial farmers (99.9%) are not interested in forming 
equity-schemes. Therefore, the policies adopted by the new Government have 
accomplished little in terms of promoting the participation of previously disadvantaged 
people into the mainstream of agricultural activities through equity-schemes. This section 
analyzes the reasons why commercial farmers find it difficult and/or non beneficial to 
enter into equity-schemes and suggests modifications to the Government policies to make 
equity-schemes more attractive to commercial farmers.  
According to the PWH model, if commercial farmers want to expand their 
operations they need complementarity among production factors; if commercial farmers 
want to focus on niche markets, they need the asset specificity of labor. In both cases,   21
equity-schemes are less costly (in terms of costliness of coordination errors) than spot 
markets to acquire production factors. However, some commercial farmers who want to 
expand or enter new markets through equity-schemes may consider this strategy is (1) not 
feasible for two reasons:  
- A lack of potential partners available (farm workers with education and 
knowledge to understand an equity-scheme). 
- A lack of institutional acceptability (commercial farmers simply may not want to 
associate with farm workers). 
(2) not beneficial for two reasons: 
- It is too risky (mutual distrust between farm workers and commercial farmers);  
- It is too costly (time) to implement.  
In addition, partnering with farm workers indirectly involves politics. It is likely 
that the Government will support farm workers in case of a dispute with commercial 
farmers. This increases the potential for farm workers’ opportunistic behavior and 
commercial farmers’ risk. Lastly, the time needed to negotiate the equity-scheme with 
farm workers and Governmental institutions, organize farm workers and train them is too 
long (Lutouw took 4 years to start operations since the beginning of negotiations). Thus, 
equity-schemes’ returns may not be favorable for commercial farmers. On the other hand, 
if commercial farmers want to keep the same size of operations (assumes no changes in 
their customers’ needs), they do not need additional complementarity among production 
factors or asset specificity; hence, the equity-scheme is more costly in terms of its 
governance structure than commercial farmers operating by themselves.    22
Government policies can make equity-schemes more attractive to commercial 
farmers. Equity-schemes are chosen based on commercial farmers need for 
complementarity or asset specificity. With its current policies the Government creates 
complementarity among production factors (land, water and credit policies linked to 
labor) for commercial farmers who want to expand their operations or enter into “fair 
trade” markets. Can the government create complementarity for commercial farmers who 
want to keep the size of their activities? Yes, but commercial farmers may exit the 
agricultural activity (affecting the economic growth of the agricultural sector in South 
Africa) because they may consider that equity-schemes are not feasible or beneficial 
(remember that vertical integration is not feasible and relation-based alliances are not 
beneficial). Therefore, the statements below are is necessary to assess policies to make 
equity-schemes feasible and favorable. 
- To address the lack of benefits and increased risks and costs to commercial 
farmers, the Government should develop a legal body that regulates equity-schemes, and 
stresses the role of the Government in monitoring them.  
- To reduce the cost of forming equity-schemes, an office that coordinates the 
interaction among possible partners should be created. The office will work as a center 
that gathers the profiles of possible partners (Government institutions, NGOs, 
foundations, financial firms and intermediaries/processors/retailers).  
- The Government should have as a priority to elevate the education level of farm 
workers. It will be more efficient and more productive for commercial farmers to train 
and organize an educated labor force.   23
- The Government could provide tax incentives to those commercial farmers who 
enter into equity-schemes with farm workers. However, some regulations must be in 
place to assure that farm workers participate actively in the strategic decisions of the 
equity-schemes.  
- To monitor equity-schemes the Government could renew the rights to use water 
and land depending on the performance of the managerial team depending on the 
profitability and transfer of knowledge (production, managerial and marketing) to farm 
workers. 
- To increase the returns of the equity-schemes, the Land Bank should participate, 
actively, as a partner. The Land Bank owns farms that were foreclosed hence, it can 
contribute land to an equity-scheme to finance the shares of farm workers. Once the Land 
Bank has recovered the money from its investment (land), it can transfer/sell/subsidize its 
shares in the equity-scheme to farm workers diminishing the investment necessary for the 
project, and increasing the returns for the partners. 
- To address the feasibility issue due to commercial farmers considering farm 
workers as inadequate partners, the Government should start an education programs to 
upgrade the literacy and business skills of farm workers (emphasizing entrepreneurial 
capacities). Commercial farmers will be more interested in developing equity-schemes 
with partners that understand the essence of business (profits generation). 
The policies of the new Government have not brought a massive creation of 
equity-schemes between commercial farmers and farm workers. Commercial farmers 
who want to expand their activities or access to niche markets primarily participate and 
initiate equity-schemes. Thus, most commercial farmers in South Africa are choosing to   24
either (1) keep the size of their operations the same, (2) pay market rates for financing or 
(3) purchasing land and other input rights from existing operations.  
 
7. Conclusions 
The end of the Apartheid and the new South African Government altered the 
factor and product markets in the agricultural sector. These alterations intended to create 
opportunities for farm workers but resulted in compromising commercial farmers’ 
operations with limited impact on improving farm workers situation. As a response, few 
commercial farmers implemented equity-schemes with farm workers. For those 
commercial farmers who did create an equity-scheme, it was a business strategy to 
increase their profitability by eliminating barriers to factor markets, achieving economies 
of scale and scope, taking advantage of learning curve and diminishing transaction costs. 
In addition, equity-schemes allow commercial farmers to strategically address 
consumer’s needs. 
The ability of equity-schemes to eliminate farm workers’ barriers to entry to 
factors and product markets depends on the commercial farmers’ strategy. It is more 
likely that farm workers will have access to knowledge, credit and have land ownership 
only if commercial farmers want to focus in marketing activities. However, it is less 
likely that farm workers will attain marketing skills. 
Government policies are not accomplishing their purpose because commercial 
farmers prefer not to form equity-schemes and the existing equity-schemes do not 
guarantee the elimination of barriers to factor and product markets for farm workers. The 
policies should be modified to increase farm workers participation in the most profitable   25
agrifood supply chains making equity-schemes more attractive to commercial farmers 
and making sure that farm workers access to strategic managerial positions in the equity-
schemes. 
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Table 1. Farm workers access to factor markets in each equity-scheme 
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